Are Monetary Models with Exogenous Money Growth Rule Able to Match the Taylor Rule? by Auray, Stéphane & Fève, Patrick
Are Monetary Models with Exogenous Money Growth
Rule Able to Match the Taylor Rule?
Ste´phane Auray
University of Toulouse (Gremaq)
Patrick Fe`ve∗†
University of Toulouse (Gremaq and Idei)
Abstract
This paper questions the ability of three monetary models to quantitatively re-
produce a Taylor rule when considered as a useful way to describe monetary facts.
Using a standard econometric procedure, we estimate the relation between the nom-
inal interest rate, the expected inflation and the output gap under these monetary
models with exogenous money growth rule. We show that the estimated relation
under the flexible price model – implying Fisherian inflation premia – is close to
the empirical estimates from actual data. Conversely both the sticky prices and the
limited participation models – consistent with the monetary transmission mecha-
nism and the liquidity effect – are not able to match estimates of the Taylor rule
from actual data.
Keywords: flexible prices, sticky prices, limited participation, Taylor rule
JEL Class.: E32, E4, E52
∗Corresponding author: GREMAQ–Universite´ de Toulouse I, manufacture des Tabacs, baˆt. F, 21
alle´e de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse. email: patrick.feve@univ-tlse1.fr
†We would like to thank P. Beaudry, F. Collard, J. Diaz–Gimnez, A. Dibb, R. Farmer, J.P. Florens,
J.O. Hairault, A. Khan, T. Kehoe, H. Le Bihan, O. Licandro, F. Portier, V. Rios–Rull and K. Salyer
for helpful comments. This paper has benefited from discussions during presentations at the Dynamic
Macroeconomics Workshop (Vigo, 2002) and EEA (Venice, 2002). The traditional disclaimer applies.
1
Introduction
In a famous paper, Taylor [1993] showed that US monetary policy after 1986 is well
characterized by a simple rule wherein the interest rate – the nominal Federal funds rate
– responds positively to the inflation rate and to the output gap. This rule presents the
attractive empirical feature to be robust over periods, monetary regimes and countries (see
Clarida, Gali and Gertler [1998], [2000] and Taylor [1999]). For example, the estimated
nominal interest rate and the estimated expected inflation parameters generally have the
expected sign and are significant. However, previous empirical results suggest that the
estimated parameter of the expected output gap is marginally significant for the Volcker–
Greenspan era (see Clarida, Gali and Gertler [2000]). Various interpretations may be
given to the estimated Taylor rule (see Taylor [1999]). First, the estimated rule can be
considered as a guideline – or explicit formula – for the central bank to follow when making
monetary policy decisions. In this case, the Taylor rule describes how a central bank sets
the nominal interest rate in response to economic variables (the inflation rate and the
output gap). Second, it can be used as a way to examine several episodes of monetary
history. In this case, the estimated rule does not necessarily represent the “true” central
bank behavior, but rather a useful description of the monetary policy in different historical
time periods.
Over the recent years, there has been a great resurgence of interest on how to conduct
monetary policy. Fundamentally, the central bank controls only the volume of bank
reserves. To do this, the central bank buys or sells Treasury bills in the open market,
thereby either taking reserves away from banks or giving banks reserves. The central
bank can use this one instrument to control some measure of the money supply (M1, M2
or any other measure of the money stock the central bank can invent). Indeed, in the
1970s the U.S. Federal Reserve bank did just that by creating many measures of money.
Alternatively, the central bank can control short-term interest rates, the federal funds rate
in the U.S. case which is the rate banks pay to borrow reserves. Then, the central bank
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can target bank reserves, some definition of the money stock, or the short-term interest
rates. Whatever they do, they can just use one instrument. A consensus has emerged
about the fact that monetary policy should be focused on the control of inflation using
the short term interest rates as instrument. However, the bank central’s objective for
open market operations has varied over the years, over monetary regimes and countries.
Therefore, the question remains open. In this paper, considering the theoretical consensus
described below, we use the second interpretation of the Taylor rule – i.e. a useful way
to describe monetary policy and monetary facts –.
Whatever the monetary policy is, the problem is to identify and to estimate consistently
the assumed central bank behavior. Any monetary rule is estimated using aggregate data
which are the realization of the economic equilibrium. Therefore, the econometrician
must use a set of relevant instrumental variables in order to identify and estimate the
structural equation that summarizes the central bank behavior. For example, empirical
studies on the Taylor rule generally use four–lagged inflation, output and nominal interest
rates as instrumental variables (see Clarida et al. [1998] and [2000]). Using the same
econometric procedure, we estimate the relation between the nominal interest rate, the
expected inflation and the output gap under three monetary models with an exogenous
money growth rule.1 This paper examines under this methodology the Volcker–Greenspan
monetary era using the framework of an interest rate rule for monetary policy as described
by Taylor [1999]. The aim of this paper is to judge of the ability of monetary models with
exogenous money growth rule – consistent with different monetary stylized facts we are
going to describe – to reproduce the estimated Taylor rule.
Before the exposition of the monetary models, let us first review a set of empirical mon-
etary facts that basically motivate our specification choices.
1Our approach is similar to Auray and Fe`ve [2002] and Salyer and Van Gaasbeck [2002], but it extends
these previous studies in several ways. In Auray and Fe`ve [2002] , we only consider monetary models
without capital accumulation. Moreover, the Taylor rule is simpler as it only includes expected inflation.
In their paper, Salyer and Van Gaasbeck [2002] only consider a limited participation model and a Taylor
rule without nominal interest rate inertia.
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A first part of the empirical literature describes the long–run monetary facts examining
data over long periods (see Lucas [1980], Barro [1990], Poole [1994] and McCandless and
Weber [1995]). They show that the growth rates of the money supply and the general price
level are highly correlated for different money definitions (M1 orM2) over a period running
from 1960 to 1990. Therefore, these studies support the quantity theory of money. Under
this theory, rapid money growth is associated with high inflation as well as with high
interest rates. Indeed, the interest rates behavior can similarly be understood in terms
of Fisherian inflation premia. More recently, Monnet and Weber [2001], using data since
1960 to 1998 for about 40 countries, show that money and interest rates are positively
related, supporting, therefore, the Fisher equation view.
Another part of the empirical literature attempts to uncover the effects of monetary policy
over the business cycle using the Vector Autoregression methodology. This empirical liter-
ature usually finds a non–neutrality property of money in the short–run. More specifically,
three main stylized facts seem to emerge from empirical studies: following a contractionary
monetary policy, (i) there is a persistent decline in real GDP; (ii) prices are almost non
responsive in the very short–run but decrease and (iii) the nominal interest rate rises.
(i) together with (ii) constitute the so–called monetary transmission mechanism and (i)
together with (iii) define the liquidity effect. These results seem to be robust to different
identification schemes (see e.g. Sims [1992], Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [1996]
and [1999] , Sims and Zha [1995] and Leeper, Sims and Zha [1996]). Consequently, any
structural model that could plausibly be used for monetary policy analysis should be able
to account for these two mechanisms.
In order to account for these monetary facts, our experiment is conducted using a flexible
prices model – implying a Fisherian inflation premia –, a sticky prices model – consis-
tent with the monetary transmission mechanism – and a limited participation model –
reproducing a liquidity effect –. Moreover, any theoretical analysis needs to reconcile
these facts with empirical studies on monetary policy rules. The central question that
4
this paper studies is the following : Are monetary models with exogenous money growth
rule –implying either Fisherian inflation premia, the monetary transmission mechanism
or the liquidity effect – able to match the estimated Taylor rule?
Flexible prices monetary models, using either a cash–in–advance constraint (see e.g. Lu-
cas and Stokey [1983] or Cooley and Hansen [1989] for an application) or the money in
the utility function, imply that following a positive money injection output drops and the
nominal interest rate rises. Indeed, in these models, the individuals attempt to escape the
inflation tax the money injection creates by decreasing their consumption and increasing
their leisure. Therefore the output drops. Further, since households postpone consump-
tion and save more, the nominal interest rate raises. For a large part, this result may be
explained by the existence of the inflation tax. Therefore, this model is consistent with
the Fisherian inflation premia but not with the monetary transmission mechanism nor
the liquidity effect. Hence, most of the models that have attempted to provide with a
better representation of the effects of monetary policy on aggregate dynamics have tried
to weaken the inflation tax.
A first approach has been to impose price stickiness, which prevents firms from instan-
taneously adjusting prices in response to monetary policy shocks (see e.g. Hairault and
Portier [1993b], Rotemberg and Woodford [1992], Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [2000],
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [1997] among others). This assumption breaks the
inflation tax so that following a positive money injection the output rises and prices do
not — obviously — fully respond on impact. Therefore, this model is consistent with the
monetary transmission mechanism, but is still counterfactual with regard to the liquidity
effect in the short run.
A second approach has been to assume limited participation. Lucas [1990], Christiano
[1991] and Fuerst [1992] introduce limited participation in monetary model implying that
households cannot adjust to any changes in financial market circumstances. Then any
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money injection disproportionately translates in higher supply of loanable funds, which
puts downward pressure on the nominal interest rate. Access to credit being easier, firms
can increase their scale of operations and the output rises. Following a positive money
injection output rises and nominal interest declines. Therefore, this model is able to
reproduce the liquidity effect found in the data.
We show that under the flexible prices model, the estimated relation between the nominal
interest rate, the expected inflation and the output gap is close to the empirical estimates
from actual data spanning the period 1979.3–2001.1. Conversely, the sticky prices and the
limited participation model are not able to reproduce the relation between the nominal
interest rate, the inflation rate and the output gap found in the data.
The paper is organized as follows. A first section presents the three monetary models.
The second section presents the evaluation method and discusses the empirical results. A
last section offers some concluding remarks.
1 The Three Monetary Models
This section describes the main ingredients that characterize the three monetary economies.
1.1 The Cash–in–Advance model
Households
The economy is comprised of a unit mass continuum of identical infinitely lived agents.
Each household has preferences over consumption and leisure represented by the following
intertemporal utility function:
U = E0
{
∞∑
t=0
(β?)t (log(Ct)− ht)
}
(1)
where E0 denotes the conditional expectation operator at time t = 0. β
? ∈ (0, 1) is
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the discount factor (adjusted for growth), Ct and ht respectively denote the household’s
consumption services and hours worked in period t.
The intertemporal budget constraint of the household is thus given by:
Mt+1 +Bt+1 + PtIt + PtCt ≤Mt +Nt +Rt−1Bt +Wtht + PtQtKt (2)
The household enters period t with some nominal balances, Mt, that corresponds to its
money demand at the end of period t− 1. The household supplies her labor on the labor
market at the real wage rate Wt/Pt and rents out capital at the real rental rate, Qt.
During the period the households gets a lump-sum transfer of cash from the monetary
authorities equal to Nt and interest payments from bond holdings Rt−1Bt. These revenues
are used to consume Ct, to invest, It, get money and bonds for the next period, Mt+1 and
Bt+1. Investment is used to form capital according to the following law of motion:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (3)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate. Money is held because the household faces a
cash–in–advance constraint of the form:
PtCt ≤Mt +Nt +Rt−1Bt −Bt+1 (4)
The problem of the representative household is then to choose her consumption–savings,
labor and real balances plans to maximize (1) subject to (2)–(4), given the initial condi-
tions. The household’s optimal behavior is then given by the set of first order conditions:
Pt
Wt
= β?Et
[
Pt+1
Wt+1
(Qt+1 + 1− δ)
]
1 = β?EtWt
[
1
Pt+1Ct+1
]
1
PtCt
= β?EtRt
[
1
Pt+1Ct+1
]
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Firms
The representative firm produces an homogenous good that can be either invested or
consumed using the constant returns to scale technology, represented by the following
Cobb–Douglas production function:
Yt ≤ AtK
α
t (Γtht)
1−α (5)
where Kt is the aggregate capital stock and ht corresponds to hours worked. Γt denotes
Harrod neutral technological progress, and is assumed to growth at rate γ − 1 > 0. The
level of the technology At is described by the following autoregressive process of order
one:
log(At+1) = ρa log(At) + (1− ρa) log(A) + σaεa,t+1
where σa > 0, |ρa| < 1 and εa,t is a Gaussian white noise with unit variance.
Each period, the firm determines its demand for factor inputs from profit maximization:
max
Kt,ht
AtK
α
t (Xtht)
1−α −
Wt
Pt
ht −QtKt
The first order conditions are given by :
Qt = α
Yt
Kt
Wt
Pt
= (1− α)
Yt
ht
Government
The government finances a part of government expenditures on the good using lump sum
taxes. The government policy includes sequences of nominal transfers net of taxes Nt and
nominal government debt Bt that satisfies the following government budget constraint:
PtGt +Nt =Mt+1 −Mt +Bt+1 −Rt−1Bt
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where the initial stock of government debt, B0, is given. The stationary component of
government expenditures is assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic process of the form:
log(gt+1) = ρglog(gt) + (1− ρg)log(g) + σg²g,t+1
where σg > 0, |ρg| < 1 and ²g,t is a Gaussian white noise with unit variance.
Money Supply
Money is assumed to grow at a rate (µt − 1):
Mt+1 = µtMt (6)
We assume that µt follows an exogenous stochastic process of the following form:
log(µt+1) = ρµlog(µt) + (1− ρµ)log(µ) + σµ²µ,t+1
where σµ > 0, |ρµ| < 1 and ²µ,t is a gaussian white noise with unit variance. We finally
assume that the money created in period t is entirely distributed to households:
(µt − 1)Mt = Nt
Equilibrium
An equilibrium of this economy is a sequence of prices Pt = {Pt,Wt, qt, Rt}
∞
t=0 and a
sequence of quantitiesQt = {Ct, ht, Yt, It, Kt+1,Mt+1, Bt+1, Gt, Nt}
∞
t=0 such that for a given
sequence of prices Pt, the sequence {Ct, ht, Kt+1,Mt+1, Bt+1}
∞
t=0 maximizes households’
utility, the sequence {ht, Kt}
∞
t=0 maximizes the profit of the representative firm and for a
given sequence of quantity Qt, the sequence {Pt, rt,Wt}
∞
t=0 clears all markets, and money
is supplied according to (6).
1.2 The Sticky Prices model
This model differs from the cash–in–advance model described in the previous section
as it incorporates monopolistic competition among intermediate–goods producers (see
Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987], Ball and Romer [1991], Beaudry and Devereux [1995] and
9
King and Watson [1996] among others). If prices are free to adjust, one–time, permanent
changes in the level of the money supply will induce proportional changes in all prices,
leaving the real equilibrium unaffected. Price stickiness remains critical in generating
significant real effects of money (see Chari et al. [2000]). In this section, we add price
stickiness by assuming that producers engage in one–period, staggered price setting. We
omit any discussion of household’s behavior as it is symmetric with before.
Final good firm
In each period, a final good, Yt, is produced by a perfectly competitive firm using inputs
supplied by a continuum of intermediate–goods–producing firms indexed by i ∈ (0, 1)
using the CES technology:
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
θ
] 1
θ
with 0 < θ ≤ 1
where Yt(i) is the input of intermediate good i. Let Pt(i) and Pt denote, respectively, the
price of the intermediate good i and of the final good, the demand for good i expresses
as:
Y dt (i) =
[
Pt
Pt(i)
] 1
1−θ
Yt
from which we get the following expression for the aggregate price index:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
θ
θ−1di
] θ−1
θ
Firms
There is a continuum of firm, i ∈ (0, 1), each of which produces a particular good by means
of capital and labor according to a constant returns–to–scale technology, represented by
the production function:
Yt(i) = AtKt(i)
α(Γtht(i))
1−α with α ∈ (0, 1) (7)
where Kt(i) and ht(i) respectively denote the physical and labor input used by firm i in
the production process. At is an exogenous stationary stochastic shock whose properties
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are the same than in the cash–in–advance model. Assuming that each firm i operates
under perfect competition in the input markets, the firm determines its production plan
so as to minimize its total cost:
min
{Kt(i), ht(i)}
= Wtht(i) + qtKt(i)
subject to equation (7). qt is the nominal rental rate of capital. This yields to the following
expression for total costs:
MCtYt(i)
where the real marginal cost MCt is given by
MCt =
W 1−αt q
α
t
χAt
with χ = αα(1− α)1−α. The demand for each input is determined by:
qtKt(i) = αMCtYt(i)
Wtht(i) = (1− α)MCtYt(i)
Producers are monopolistically competitive on the good market, and therefore set prices
for the good they produce. Since the price setting is independent of any firm characteristic,
all firms choose the same price. The intermediate price index is given by:
Pt =
1
θ
Et−1
[
1
At
qαt W
(1−α)
t α
−α(1− α)(α−1)
]
(8)
According to the price stickiness assumption, the price equation (8) is the only modifica-
tion compared to the cash–in–advance model described in the previous section.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium of this economy is a sequence of prices {P∞t=0} = {Pt,Wt, qt, Rt}
∞
t=0 and a
sequence of quantities {Q∞t=0} = {Q
H∞
t=0, Q
F∞
t=0} with {Q
H∞
t=0} = {Ct, It, Bt+1, Kt, ht, Gt,Mt+1, Nt}
and {QF
∞
t=0} = {Yt, Yt(i), Kt(i), ht(i); i ∈ (0, 1)} such that for a given sequence of prices
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{Pt}, and a sequence of shocks, {Q
H∞
t=0} is a solution to the representative household’s
problem, {QF
∞
t=0} is a solution to the representative firms’ problem and for a given se-
quence of quantity Qt and a sequence of shocks, the sequence {P
∞
t=0} clears all markets,
and money is supplied according to (6). Finally, prices satisfy equation (8).
1.3 The Limited Participation model
Lucas [1990], Christiano [1991] and Fuerst [1992], among others, have proposed to in-
troduce limited participation in the model implying that households cannot adjust their
behavior to any changes in financial market circumstances. Then, any money injection
disproportionately translates in higher supply of loanable funds, which puts downward
pressure on the nominal interest rate. Access to credit being cheaper, firms can increase
their scale of operations and the output rises. This limited participation model is similar
to Christiano [1991] and Fuerst [1992]. We just describe the main ingredients of this
model which differ from the cash-in–advance model.
Households
At the beginning of the period t, money supply Mt is held by households in the form of
cash (M ct ) and deposits (M
d
t ), such that total money held by households is given by:
Mt =M
c
t +M
d
t (9)
M ct can be interpreted as money held in checking account that yield zero interest rate
and M ct as money held in saving accounts that yields a positive nominal interest rate
(Rt − 1) > 0. A checking account is needed by each household as cash to purchase goods
such that each household faces the following cash–in–advance constraint:
PtCt ≤M
c
t (10)
The nominal income of households is composed of wage income Wtht, interest income
associated to money deposits (Rt − 1)M
d
t , and dividends from firms Ft, and financial
intermediaries, Bt. These revenues are used to consume and get money for the next
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period. The budget constraint then takes the following form:
M ct+1 +M
d
t+1 = RtM
d
t +Wtht + Ft +Bt − PtCt +M
c
t (11)
The problem of an household is then to choose her consumption–savings, labor and money
holdings plans, {ct, ht,M
c
t+1,M
d
t+1}
∞
t=0, to maximize (1) subject to (9)–(11), and given the
stochastic process for {Pt,Wt, Rt, Bt, Ft}
∞
t=0 and the initial conditions M
c
0 ,M
d
0 > 0.
Firms
The capital stock is owned by firms and labor is rented at the nominal wage Wt. Firms
borrow money from a financial intermediary at interest rate Rt in order to finance the
wage bill Wtht. After payments of interests to financial intermediaries, wage bill and
capital expenditures, the dividends distributed at the household are:
Ft = PtYt −RtWtht − PtIt
Firms choose the contingency plan {Yt, ht, Kt+1, Pt, Ft}
∞
t=0 to maximize the expected value
of the dividend flow:
E0
{
∞∑
t=0
Λt+1Ft
}
subject to the constraints (3), (5), (6) and given the stochastic process for {Pt,Wt, Rt,Λt, At}
∞
t=0
and the initial condition for capital stock K0 ≥ 0. As firms act in the best interest of
the shareholders, the stochastic discount factor Λt+1 corresponds to the representative
household’s relative valuation of cash across time:
Λt+1 =
(β?)t+1
Pt+1Ct+1
Financial intermediaries
At the beginning of the period t, financial intermediaries supply a quantity of money
which comes from the loanable funds provided by the households M dt and a lump sum
cash injection Nt from the monetary authorities. Loan market clearing thus requires:
Wtht =M
d
t +Nt
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At the end of the period, financial intermediaries have to repay the interests for the money
loans by the households. Consequently, profits flow for the financial intermediaries are
given by Bt = RtNt.
Government
The government finances government expenditures on the good using lump sum taxes.
The government policy satisfies the following government budget constraint:
PtGt +Nt =Mt+1 −Mt
Equilibrium
An equilibrium of this economy is a sequence of prices Pt = {Pt,Wt, qt, Rt}
∞
t=0 and a
sequence of quantitiesQt = {Ct, ht, Yt, It, Kt+1,M
c
t+1,M
d
t+1, Bt, Gt, Nt, Ft}
∞
t=0 such that for
a given sequence of prices Pt, the sequence {Ct, ht,M
c
t+1,M
d
t+1}
∞
t=0 maximizes households’
utility, the sequence {ht, Kt+1}
∞
t=0 maximizes the profit of the representative firm and for
a given sequence of quantity Qt, the sequence {Pt, rt,Wt}
∞
t=0 clears all markets.
2 The Estimated Taylor Rule
This section presents the method of quantitative evaluation we retain here. We evaluate
the ability of each model to reproduce a Taylor type rule estimated from the actual data.
The benchmark calibration is then presented and we discuss the empirical results. The
flexible prices, the sticky prices and the limited participation models are denoted CIA,
SP and LP hereafter.
2.1 Quantitative Evaluation
We use the three models as a DGP which allows to reproduce some features of actual
data, which is taken as the realization of an unknown – to the econometrician – stochastic
process. The features we are interested in include a set of conditional moments on the
nominal interest rate, the inflation rate and the output gap. More precisely, we specify
a Taylor type rule that aims at describing the joint behavior of nominal interest rate,
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inflation rate and output gap, given a set of restrictions based on the information set.
The specification that we use takes the following simple form:
R̂t = ρR̂t−1 + ηEtpit+1 + ϕEtŷt+1 (12)
where the hat denotes the percentage of deviation from the long run value.2 This Taylor
type rule incorporates the lagged interest rate, the expected inflation rate and the expected
output gap. Equation (12) is rather standard as we follow the specification proposed by
Clarida et al. [2000]. Moreover, as in Clarida et al. [2000], the output gap is obtained in
deviation from a quadratic trend. Previous empirical results suggest that the estimated
parameter of expected output gap ϕ is marginally significant for the Volcker–Greenspan
era (see Clarida et al. [2000]). Conversely, the estimates of η and ρ are significant and
positive in most cases (see Taylor [1999] and Clarida et al. [2000]). The specification com-
bines a partial adjustment of actual interest rate to the target and a target specification
which includes the expected inflation and the expected output gap. Equation (12) can be
specified as a partial adjustment to the target:
R̂t = ρR̂t−1 + (1− ρ)R̂
?
t (13)
where
R̂?t = (η
?Etpit+1 + ϕ
?Etŷt+1)
and η? = η/(1− ρ) and ϕ? = ϕ/(1− ρ). We essentially retain the first specification (12),
as we faced numerous numerical failures when we estimate the Taylor type rule (13) under
the three structural models. Equation (12) can be expressed in terms of observable:
R̂t = ρR̂t−1 + ηpit+1 + ϕŷt+1 + εt+1
where εt+1 = −η (pit+1 − Etpit+1)−ϕ (ŷt+1 − Etŷt+1). Let Zt denotes a vector of instrument
known in period t. This instruments verifies a set of orthogonality conditions:
E (εt+1 ⊗ Zt) = 0
2As each variable that enters in the Taylor type rule (12) are demeaned, we do not introduce a constant
term.
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or equivalently
E
((
R̂t − ρR̂t−1 − ηpit+1 − ϕŷt+1
)
⊗ Zt
)
= 0 (14)
where ⊗ denotes the kronecker product. Equation (14) is the basis of the GMM estimation
of the parameters ψ = {ρ, η, ϕ} given a weighting matrix that accounts for possible serial
correlation. Let us introduce the empirical counterpart of (14)
gT =
1
T
∑((
R̂t − ρR̂t−1 − ηpit+1 − ϕŷt+1
)
⊗ Zt
)
where T denotes the size of the sample. A GMM estimator ψ̂T of ψ is a value of ψ that
minimizes the following quadratic loss function:
ψ̂T = Argmin
ψ
g′TWTgT
whereWT represents the weighting matrix. Necessary conditions for identification impose
that the number of instrument will be greater than equal to the number of parameters to
be estimated. We closely follow previous empirical studies as our instrument set includes
Zt =
{
R̂t−1, ..., R̂t−4, pit−1, ..., pit−4, ŷt−1, ..., ŷt−4
}
This leads to nine overidentifying restrictions that we can test in order to check for the
validity of this specification given the set of instrumental variables. Note that we need
an estimate of the weighting matrix WT before estimating ψ and we need an estimate
of ψ before estimating this matrix WT . An approach suggested by Hansen [1982] is to
iterate back and forth between parameter estimation and weighting matrix estimation
until a fixed point for ψ is reached. A last point concerns the weighting matrix estimation
procedures. We use the Newey and West [1987] estimate with a lag length equals to four.
Consider now ψ̂T an estimate of ψ for a sample of size T using equations (14). The esti-
mated value summarize a set of conditional moments for the joint process {R̂t, R̂t−1, pit+1, ŷt+1}.
If the J statistic does not reject the model, we can consider that this simple parametric
and parsimonious model account for most of the features of the nominal interest rate,
inflation rate and output gap. We use this description of the data in order to assess the
fit of various monetary models with respect to the specification (12). For each model, we
proceed as follows:
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Step 1 From (i) the log–linear approximation of equilibrium conditions about the deter-
ministic steady state, (ii) the vector of the structural parameters θ (see table 1),
(iii) initials conditions for the predetermined and exogenous variables and (iv) the
shocks, N simulated paths for a sample of size T , denoted R˜it(θ), p˜i
i
t(θ) and y˜
i
t(θ) are
performed (i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T ).
Step 2 We add the deterministic growth component to the simulated cyclical output y˜it(θ)
and we obtained the output gap – denoted ˜̂yt+1,i(θ) (i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T ) –
as in actual data, i.e. in deviation from a quadratic trend.
Step 3 An estimate ψ˜iT (θ) (i = 1, ..., N) for ψ minimizes the quadratic form
ψ˜iT (θ) = Argmin
ψ
g˜′T,i(θ)W˜T,ig˜T,i(θ)
where g˜T,i(θ) is the simulated sample analog of (14):
g˜T (θ) =
1
T
∑(( ˜̂
Rt,i(θ)− ρ
˜̂
Rt−1,i(θ)− η ˜̂pit+1,i(θ)− ϕ˜̂yt+1,i(θ)
)
⊗ Z˜t,i(θ)
)
where Z˜t,i the set of simulated instrumental variables under each structural model:
Z˜t,i =
{
˜̂
Rt−1,i(θ), ...
˜̂
Rt−4,i(θ), ˜̂pit−1,i(θ), ..., ˜̂pit−4,i(θ), ˜̂yt−1,i(θ), ...,
˜̂yt−4,i(θ)
}
The weighting matrix W˜T,i is estimated using the Newey and West estimate using
the same lag length than in the actual data.
Step 4 From these N simulations,we construct the average:
ψ˜NT (θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ψ˜iT (θ)
The simulations (Step 1 to 4) are only used to compute ψT (θ) because direct calculations
are complicated. As N becomes large, we may expect that ψ˜NT (θ) ≈ ψT (θ). ψT (θ)
represents the implied estimate of the Taylor type rule for a sample of size T . If there
exist a small sample biais, this estimated value departs from the value of the parameter
implied by each model. However, as T becomes large, we have ψT (θ) ≈ ψ(θ). In what
follows, we consider these two estimates of the Taylor rule, denoted ψT (θ) and ψ(θ).
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The estimated value of ψ obtained under each model is then compared to the one obtained
from the data. Moreover, using the covariance matrix Σ̂T of ψ̂T ,
Σ̂T =
(
∂g′T
∂ψ
∣∣∣∣
ψ=ψ̂T
ŴT
∂gT
∂ψ′
∣∣∣∣
ψ=ψ̂T
)−1
where ŴT is the estimated weighting matrix at convergence, one may construct a Wald
statistic
W =
(
ψ̂T − ψ˜
N
T (θ)
)
Σ̂−1T
(
ψ̂T − ψ˜
N
T (θ)
)′
In our case, the three parameters of interest are ρ, η and ϕ. The statistic is thus asymp-
totically distributed as a chi-square with three degrees of freedom. Note also that we can
construct a Wald statistic associated to each element of ψ separately. This latter allows
to locate some failures of the structural models with regard to specific empirical features
of the estimated Taylor type rule. In this case, the Wald statistic is distributed as a
chi-square with one degree of freedom.
2.2 Calibration
Before any simulation experiments, we need to fix the structural parameters (see Table 1).
This concerns the deep parameters which represent preferences and technology and the
parameters associated to the forcing variables. It is worth noting that the three models
share exactly the same parameters, the difference in their outcomes coming from different
assumptions about market arrangements. The discount factor is set to 0.989 implying a
long run real interest rate equals to 4.4% per year. The capital share is fixed to 33%.
With linear utility in leisure, we do not have to fix the time spent to economic activity
for the CIA and SP models. Conversely, long run constraints in the LP model imposes
to fix this time spent. We consider that individual allows 70% of their time endowment
excluding sleeping hours to economic activities. The share of government spending is
fixed to 20% of GDP. The parameters of the forcing variables are fixed in two ways.
First concerning the technological and the government spending shocks, we follows the
previous calibrations. Second, concerning the money growth we estimate an autoregressive
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Table 1: Calibration
Parameters Value Description
β? 0.989 Subjective discount factor
δ 0.019 Rate of depreciation of the capital stock
α 0.333 Capital share
γ 1.015 Steady state growth rate
h 0.700 Time spend to productive activity
g 0.200 Share of public spending
Money supply
M1
ρ 0.618 Persistence of money growth
σm 0.0122 s.e. of money shock
γm 1.0126 Rate of growth of money supply
M2
ρ 0.562 Persistence of money growth
σm 0.0122 s.e. of money shock
γm 1.0145 Rate of growth of money supply
Technological shock
ρa 0.95 Persistence of technological shock
σa 0.0079 s.e. of technological shock
Government spending shock
ρa 0.97 Persistence of government spending shock
σa 0.02 s.e. of government spending shock
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process of order one for a sample period 1979:3–2001.1 with quarterly frequency data. We
consider alternatively M1 and M2 as measures of money stock.
3 It is worth noting that
the autoregressive parameters forM1 is larger than the one frequently used in quantitative
exercises.
2.3 Empirical Results
We first present the estimated Taylor from actual data and then discuss whether the three
monetary models are consistent with the interest rule estimated from actual the data.
The data are quarterly time series spanning the period 1979:3–2001.1. We use as the
interest rate the Federal Funds rate expressed in annual rate. The measure of inflation
is the annualized rate of change in the GDP deflator between two subsequent quarters.4
The output gap is obtained as the deviation of the logarithm of GDP from a quadratic
trend.
Table 2 reports the GMM estimates of the Taylor type rule. In the first column, we report
the estimated value from actual data and the standard errors are in parentheses.5 All the
estimated parameters have the expected sign: the nominal interest rate displays some
inertia, the parameter associated to expected inflation is positive and exceeds unity and
the parameter associated to output gap is positive and significant. The parameters of the
target are very close to previous estimates: η̂/(1− ρ̂) = 1.52 and ϕ̂/(1− ρ̂) = 0.25.
We now discuss the implementation of the evaluation method. The estimate ψT (θ) is
3The data were obtained from the Federal Reserve Data Bases available at
http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/data/monetary/m1sl and m2sl. Quarterly data are obtained
by quarter average.
4The data were obtained from the Federal Reserve Data Bases. Federal fund rate:
http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/data/irates/fedfunds, monthly frequency, average of
daily figures. The quarterly rate is defined as the quarter average. GDP deflator:
http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/data/gdp/gdp for GDP in current dollars divided by
http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/data/gdp/gdpc1 for the GDP of chained 1996 dollars, S.A..
5Note also that we report the estimated parameters of the Taylor rule (12). It follows that the
estimated values of η and ϕ do not represent the parameters associated to the target.
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obtained using N = 100 simulations6 were used for a sample size equals to 87. Simulated
values are redrawn from the same seed values for each evaluation of the three structural
models. In order to reduce the effect of initial conditions, simulated samples include 100
initial points which are subsequently discarded in the estimation. The estimate ψ(θ) is
obtained using T = 10000.
Tables 2 and 3 report the GMM estimates of the Taylor type rule under the three models.
We summarize the main empirical findings as follow.
First, the estimated values for the lagged nominal interest rate and the inflation rate –
using either M1 or M2 – have the expected positive sign under the flexible prices model.
Moreover these values are close to those obtained under actual data. However, the esti-
mated value for the expected output gap is close to zero.
Second, the values for the lagged nominal interest rate and the expected inflation rate
under the sticky prices model have the right sign. Nevertheless, the value of the expected
inflation rate is significantly greater than the one obtained on actual data.
Third, the estimated value of the expected inflation rate under the limited participation
model does not have the expected sign. Moreover, the nominal interest rate displays too
weak inertia.
Fourth, the P–value of the Wald statistics clearly shows that any of the model we consider
is not able to match simultaneously the conditional moments on the nominal interest rate,
the expected inflation rate and the expected output gap at standard level. However, the
highest P–value of the Wald statistic associated to all elements of ψ is obtained under the
cash–in–advance model. Moreover, the P–value of the Wald statistic associated to each
element of ψ shows that the cash–in–advance is able to match the conditional moments
on the expected inflation using M1 as measure of the money stock. Finally, this statistics
clearly shows that the sticky prices and the limited participation model do not match
6We also performed the estimation with a larger number of simulations, but the results are left
unaffected by such a change.
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Table 2: Empirical Results (ψ̂T and ψT (θ))
Parameters Historical CIA model SP model LP Model
M1
ρ 0.6984 0.5664 0.5331 0.2448
(0.043) [0.21%] [0%] [0%]
η 0.4715 0.4450 0.8758 -3.3800
(0.090) [76.9%] [0%] [0%]
ϕ 0.0771 0.0014 0.0007 -0.0197
(0.027) [0.48%] [0.44%] [0%]
W(ρ, η, ϕ) [0%] [0%] [0%]
M2
ρ 0.6984 0.5187 0.4970 0.2210
(0.043) [0%] [0%] [0%]
η 0.4715 0.4398 0.8051 -2.7487
(0.090) [72.5%] [0%] [0%]
ϕ 0.0771 0.0014 0.0005 -0.0167
(0.027) [0.48%] [0%] [0%]
W(ρ, η, ϕ) [0%] [0%] [0%]
Note : Standard–error in parentheses. P–value of the Wald statistic in brackets.
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Table 3: Empirical Results (ψ̂T and ψ(θ))
Parameters Historical CIA model SP model LP Model
M1
ρ 0.6984 0.5626 0.5029 0.4392
(0.043) [0.16%] [0%] [0%]
η 0.4715 0.3540 1.1671 -1.0757
(0.090) [19.3%] [0%] [0%]
ϕ 0.0771 -0.0021 0.0013 -0.0731
(0.027) [0.31%] [0.47%] [0%]
W(ρ, η, ϕ) [0%] [0%] [0%]
M2
ρ 0.6984 0.5178 0.4693 0.3761
(0.043) [0%] [0%] [0%]
η 0.4715 0.2737 1.1174 -0.9076
(0.090) [2.84%] [0%] [0%]
ϕ 0.0771 -0.0008 0.0012 -0.0637
(0.027) [0.37%] [0.47%] [0%]
W(ρ, η, ϕ) [0%] [0%] [0%]
Note : Standard–error in parentheses. P–value of the Wald statistic in brackets.
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the conditional moments both on (i) each element of ψ taken separately and on (ii) all
elements of ψ.
Fifth, the comparison of the GMM estimates in Tables 2 and 3 shows that there exists a
small sample biais concerning the parameter of expected inflation. Conversely, this biais
is small for parameter of lagged nominal interest rate.
3 Concluding Remarks
This paper questions the ability of monetary models, implying different monetary effects
– Fisherian inflation premia, monetary transmission mechanism or liquidity effect – to
quantitatively reproduce a Taylor rule when considered as a way to describe monetary
facts. Using the standard econometric procedure, we estimate the relation between the
nominal interest rate, the expected inflation and the output gap under three monetary
models with exogenous money growth rule. In the flexible prices model, we show that
the estimated relation between the nominal interest rate, the expected inflation and the
output gap does not depart so much from empirical estimates from actual data spanning
the Volcker–Greespan period. Conversely, the sticky prices and the limited participation
models are not able to reproduce the relation between the nominal interest rate, the
inflation rate and the output gap found in the data. If the Taylor rule is taken as a
serious description of monetary facts, our results surprisingly conclude that a monetary
model with flexible prices – inconsistent both with the monetary transmission mechanism
and the liquidity effect – provides the better match of actual data.
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